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Abstract
We study coalitional games where the proceeds from cooperation de-
pend on the entire coalition structure. The coalition structure core (K oczy,
2007) is a generalisation of the coalition structure core for such games.
We introduce a noncooperative, sequential coalition formation model
and show that the set of equilibrium outcomes coincides with the recursive
core. In order to extend past results to games that are not totally balanced
(understood in this special setting) we introduce subgame-consistency
that requires perfectness in relevant subgames only, while subgames that
are never reached are ignored.
Subject classication: C71, C72
Keywords and phrases: partition function, externalities, implementa-
tion, recursive core, stationary perfect equilibrium, time consistent equi-
librium
1 Introduction
Throughout its history the theory of coalitional games has mostly focussed on
the study of games with orthogonal coalitions, that is, coalitions, which can be
studied independently of each other. The most obvious example is the com-
monest form of a TU-game with a characteristic function that assigns a payo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1to a coalition disregarding other players and coalitions. When we look at the
usual interpretations of coalitions, be those trading blocks (Yi, 1996), trusts
(Bloch, 1995) or international environmental agreements (Funaki and Yamato,
1999; Eyckmans and Tulkens, 2003), the orthogonality assumption is dicult
to maintain; we believe it is the exception rather than the rule that coalitions
can be studied independently of each other.
Since the seminal paper of Thrall and Lucas (1963) introducing the parti-
tion function form numerous cooperative approaches and solution concepts have
been proposed to solve games with externalities, but in the absence of an im-
plementation by non-cooperative equilibria these remain interesting heuristics
(Chander and Tulkens, 1995; Ray and Vohra, 1997; Hyndman and Ray, 2007).
For games with orthogonal coalitions the implementation of cooperative solution
concepts, such as the core has an extensive literature (Chatterjee et al., 1993;
Laguno, 1994; Perry and Reny, 1994), but these results do not directly gen-
eralise to games with externalities. In this domain Huang and Sj ostr om (2006)
and K oczy (2009) have provided partial results that are limited to games with
non-empty cores in all subgames, or, in terms of sequential coalition formation
games: to games with stationary perfect equilibria. It turns out that perfectness
is a very demanding condition and the implementation might fail even for simple
TU games. We therefore introduce a generalisation, subgame-consistency, and
show that the set of partitions formed under the resulting equilibria coincides
with the recursive core.
Subgame-consistency is a weaker concept than subgame-perfectness, but
more demanding than time-consistency (Kydland and Prescott, 1977). If we
dene each of these concepts in corresponding sets of subgames, for subgame-
perfectness all subgames are relevant, while for time-consistency only the sub-
games on the equilibrium path. In particular subgame-perfect equilibria are also
subgame-consistent and subgame-consistent equilibria are also time-consistent.
Moreover stationary perfect equilibria are stationary consistent. For more on
the relation of subgame-perfect and time-consistent strategies see Fershtman
(1989) and Asilis (1995).
The structure of the paper is as follows. After this introduction a long second
section follows introducing both the cooperative and noncooperative theories to
2solve games in partition function form, we introduce the notation and simple
terminology we are going to use. We present the cooperative solution, namely
the recursive core and similarly the noncooperative coalition formation game
and its equilibria. A novel equilibrium concept, subgame consistency and the
corresponding notion of relevant subgame are also introduced here. We state
and prove our main result in the third section. The paper ends with a brief
conclusion.
2 Preliminaries
Let N denote the set of players. Subsets are called coalitions. A partition S of
S is a splitting of S into disjoint coalitions. (S) denotes the set of partitions
of S. In general we use capital and calligraphic letters to denote a set and its
partition (the set of players N being an exception), indexed capital letters are
elements of the partition. We write i 2 S if there exists Sk such that i 2 Sk 2 S
and if i 2 S we write S(i) for the coalition embedded in S containing i.
The game (N;V ) is given by the player set N and a partition function (Thrall
and Lucas, 1963) V : (N) ! (2N ! R), where V (Si;S) denotes the payo for
coalition Si in case partition S forms. For vectors x;y 2 RN we write xS for
the restriction to the set S and xS > yS if xi  yi for all i 2 S  N and there
exists j 2 S such that xj > yj.
The pair ! = (x;P) consisting of a payo vector x 2 RN and a partition
P 2 (N) is a payo conguration (or outcome) if
P
i2S xi = V (P;P) for all
P 2 P. The set of outcomes of game (N;V ) is denoted 
(N;V ).
Our main result is the equivalence of the partitions produced by certain
noncooperative coalition formation game and a cooperative solution concept.
In the following we spell out these approaches.
2.1 Recursive core
The rst model is a cooperative solution concept, a generalisation of the core
to games in partition function form. The core is dened in terms of deviations,
but unlike in games with orthogonal coalitions, in games with externalities the
protability of a deviation can only be determined once the partition of the
3remaining, residual players is also known, or at least some assumption is formu-
lated about their behaviour. While most of the approaches (see K oczy, 2007,
for further references) tried to get rid of the externalities and solve the game as
a characteristic function form game, Huang and Sj ostr om (2003) and (K oczy,
2007) assume that these residual players play a residual game that is a game
on its own and thus can be solved using the same concept. Once the solution
of this game is known, we know which partition is formed, and then it is also
possible to tell the deviating players' payos. If this partition is not unique
(or not determined, in case the residual core is empty) K oczy (2007) considers
optimistic and pessimistic scenarios depending on the deviating players' expec-
tations regarding these alternatives. Our results will apply to the pessimistic
case, so only this version of the denition is given.
First we introduce residual games and then the recursive core:
Denition 1 (Residual Game). Let (N;V ) be a game and consider the set
L ( N of live players. Assume K = N nL have committed to form partition K.
Then the residual game (L;V K) is the partition function form game over the
player set L and with the partition function V K : L ! (2L ! R), where
V K(C;L) = V (C;L [ K) 8C;L : C 2 L 2 L: (2.1)
The residual game is derived from the original game using the partition K, but
it is a partition function game on its own. So if we use the core to solve (N;V ),
we must also use it to solve (L;V K): Deviating coalitions must expect a residual
core outcome to form. Should the core be empty this solution does not present a
selection of the outcomes, and all possible responses must be considered. Even if
the residual core is non-empty it may contain payo congurations with dierent
partitions. This gives rise the the following denition.
Denition 2 (Recursive core). Let (N;V ) be a partition function form game.
1. Trivial game. The core of (f1g;V ) is the only outcome with the trivial









2. Inductive assumption: The core C(N;V ) has been dened for all games





C(N;V ) if C(N;V ) 6= ?

(N;V ) otherwise.
3. Dominance. The outcome (x;P) is dominated via the coalition K forming
partition K if for all assumptions (yL;L) 2 A(L;V K) of the remaining set
of players L = N nK there exists an outcome ((yK;yL);K[L) 2 
(N;V )
such that yK > xK.
The outcome (x;P) is dominated if it is dominated via a coalition.
4. Core. The core, denoted C(N;V ), is the set of undominated outcomes.
A partition is only dominated via a coalition if the deviation of this coali-
tion (as a partition) is protable for every residual (core) partition. When the
residual core is empty, we have no information about the solution of the resid-
ual game, so we assume that any reaction is possible. As such, we do not, for
instance, exclude inecient partitions { just as the sequential game will be free
from such limitations in Equation 2.4. Our results, however, generalise to such
modications { as long as they are introduced in both models. For a general
discussion of the properties of the recursive core see K oczy (2007).
In the following we simply refer to the recursive core as core and to the
(recursive) core of a residual game as residual core.
2.2 Sequential coalition formation
Now we describe the noncooperative coalition formation game. While several
formulations are known in the literature, ours is closest to the models of (Bloch,
1996) and Perry and Reny (1994).
2.2.1 An informal description
Coalitions form sequentially: a coalition is proposed, the proposal is discussed
among the members and if it is accepted unanimously, those involved leave, so
that the game continues with the remaining players only. While these players
leave the game nal payos can only be determined once the entire partition is
known, and until then only advance payments are made. When all players exit,
5the game ends, those staying in the game indenitely do not receive a payo.
In the following we explain the model at length.
Time Time is continuous: players will always have a chance to act, although
will spend most of their time waiting idle. If the coalition formation process
terminates in nite steps we can ignore the depreciation of payos and hence
we will not discount payos realised in nite steps. As Perry and Reny (1994)
and Huang and Sj ostr om (2006) we also make a technical assumption of quiet
players who spend most of their time doing nothing.
Actions At each time a player can do one of the following
 make a proposal,
 accept the existing proposal, or
 wait.
A proposal is made to a coalition specifying the partition of the coalition and
a distribution rule to share the coalitional payos in each of these proposals. A
proposal must always target the proposer. A new proposal cancels the current
proposal: if there was interest in accepting it, the players involved would have
moved rst. When a proposal is accepted by all targeted players, the proposed
coalitions form and leave the game.
Payos If the coalition formation process ends with all players leaving the
game a full partition is formed for which the coalitional payos are well dened,
after which the proposals specify the individual payos. If some players remain
in the game, they do not collect a payo, or their payo is 0. Since only part
of the players' partition is dened, the players who have already left will only
be given their guaranteed payo, that is, taking a pessimistic view on what the
remaining players can do. Since the game does not formally end, payments are
made each time some players leave the game, and at each exit the coalitions who
have left receive the coalitional payo under the worst possibility (embedding
partition) given the coalitions who have already left.
6History History encompasses the entire activity log of the game including
proposals made, acceptances if any, which coalitions have left etc.
Beliefs We introduce a new element in the model. Players are not perfectly
informed about their location on the game tree. In particular, they will only
have some beliefs regarding the coalition(s) that have left last.
Our notion of belief is slightly dierent from a similar concept introduced
by Kreps and Wilson (1982) in that in their model a belief is a probabilistic
distribution over the possible histories and hence indistinguishable nodes in the
given information set, while in our model beliefs are only used to ensure that
leaving coalitions cannot completely fool the remaining players and that the
latter can possibly make the correct assessment, and therefore we look at worst
cases rather than of expectations.
Finally, we assume that beliefs are common to all players1 and are decided
by nature. Recollections are only updated when some players leave.
Strategies A strategy of a player species his actions for each state of the
game given all histories. We will be especially interested in strategies that are
stationary, strategies that only depend on the current state of the game, but
not on past actions. Strategies can also depend on the current recollection.
2.2.2 The formal treatment
The sequential coalition formation game (N;V ) is dened over the same player
set N and the same partition function V , although the game is played in an
entirely dierent way. Without loss of generality we assume 0 < minP;S V (S;P)
therefore staying in the game forever is never optimal.
1. Initially all players are active and no proposals have been made.
2. One of the players makes a proposal to an active subset of the players
including himself specifying a partition of this set as well as a distribution
of the coalitional values.
1We can assume that the player who is the most condent in her recollections is the one
who acts rst and the rest accept her story.
73. If this proposal is attractive, the invited players accept the proposal one-
by-one.
4. When all players have accepted, the proposed coalitions form and leave
the game.
5. The coalitions that have left receive some payment based on what they
have already earned, that is, the minimal payment for these coalitions in
any embedding partition taking the exited coalitions given.
6. At this point the recollection about the order of the coalitions that have
left is updated. The updated value is decided by nature.
7. The game continues with the remaining players.
8. If a proposal is not attractive, the invited players do not accept it and
another proposer can move forward. 2
9. This proposal is accepted or rejected as before making way to new pro-
posals, etc.
10. If all players have left, the game ends.
Proposals A proposal p by player i is oered to a set of players T 3 i,
specifying a partition T 2 T and a distribution w of coalitional payos in
each of the coalitions in T . We assume
P
i2Ti wi = 1 for all Ti 2 T , so w only
species the share of the payo a particular player will receive, but until the
value of the coalition is realised, the exact value is not known. As Huang and
Sj ostr om (2006) point out this setup is not the most general, but specifying
individual payos adds only complexity to the model.
Permitting players to propose a partition is not the usual way to dene such
games, but is needed to obtain eciency of the equilibrium partitions due to
the externalities (K oczy, 2009). For games with orthogonal coalitions proposing
single or multiple coalitions makes no dierence. This idea is somewhat unusual
2Here we use the assumption that there are plenty of opportunities to accept a proposal so
if a player does not, but allows another one to make another proposal, then he is essentially
rejecting it. Bloch (1996) only allows the rejecting player to make a proposal, but with this
assumption our setup is essentially the same.
8although there are a number of real-life examples (the Yalta Conference, mergers
with divestiture).
Formally a proposal p = (T ;w) 2 T  [0;1]T, where T  N n K and
P
i2Ti wi = 1 for all Ti 2 T .
The set of proposals available to i are denoted Pi while P collects all possible
proposals.
History The game is specied in an extensive form, where decisions are made
at each node. History tells what decisions have been made and thus where, at
which node are we currently.
Denition 3. History ht at time t is a list of oers, acceptances and rejections
up to period t.
There is a natural interpretation of moving down the game tree as the passing
of time, but time is ordinal, so the exact location of a node/history on the
timeline is irrelevant, so in the sequel we drop the reference to time. We can,
however say that if h1  h2, then h1 happened earlier than h2.
History has more data we will ever need, but we can focus on (the eects
of) certain key decisions. Among others history contains.
 the set of players K(h) =
S
S2K(h) S  N who have already left the game
forming partition K(h) 2 K(h),
 the set of feasible proposals P(h) = f(T ;w) 2 P jT  N n K(h)g and
Pi(h) = P(h) \ Pi,
 the current proposal p(h) = (T (h);w(h)) 2 P(h),
 the distribution rule for the quit players w(h) 2 RN, where we set wi(h) =
1
jLj for all i 62 K,
 the set of players A(h)  T(h) who have already accepted the proposal,
 and nally (h) the belief at node h.
The set of histories is denoted by H.
When a history h has been reached, all future histories can only be extensions
of h. The set of such feasible histories is denoted Hh = fh0 2 H jh  h0g.
9Strategies The strategy of a player species an action for every possible his-
tory. It species whether it should take initiative, if so, whether it should accept
a current proposal or make one, and if the latter, it also includes a full speci-
cation of the proposal.
Strategy i of player i is a mapping from H to his set of actions:
i(h) 2 Pi(h) [ faccept;waitg: (2.2)
We assume that whenever a player acts: makes or accepts a proposal, this
action is preceded and followed by a nonempty open interval of time, where the
player is waiting. This is to ensure that other players have a chance to react.
When combining the players' strategies, there are a number of special situ-
ations that we discuss explicitly.
1. Initially there is no active proposal and therefore choosing \accept" is the
same as choosing \wait".
2. Similarly, if i accepts a proposal (T ;w), while i 62 T , this action has no
eect, it is ignored and history does not change.
3. When a proposal is accepted by all targeted players, these players leave.
Their subsequent actions are irrelevant, these are outside the game.
4. A new proposal cancels the previous proposal: if it was not accepted,
by our assumption this is due to lack of interest not shortage of time.
Here the question whether a race-to-react could realise in some situations.
Fortunately the answer is no, in equilibrium this will not happen, but to
see this we rst must specify payo (the incentives to play the game) and
the equilibrium concept.
We denote the restriction of strategy  to a subgame corresponding to history
h by h.
Beliefs The collective belief of the players about the last exit is nothing but
a subset of the coalition(s) who have left the game. Therefore for all h, (h) 
K(h).
While recollections of the past are described by history, in this game strate-
gies alone do not necessarily determine the nal outcome of the game. Indeed,
10each time a player leaves a game, the belief is exogenously updated (by na-
ture). As we will see, in equilibrium the outcome of the game will not depend
on beliefs, but to make the inuence of recollections more explicit in general,
the outcome resulting from the strategy prole  and the recollection-function
 can be written as !(;).
As for strategies, the restriction of  to subgame h is denoted by h. The
set of beliefs is denoted B, the set of restrictions to h by Bh.
Despite their conceptual simplicity, beliefs are rather dicult to formally
include in the model. When nature chooses a belief (really a belief-function that
species a particular belief for each history), it does not disclose its choice and
so players must act with some uncertainty. The diculty comes when working
with equilibria: while we can assume that in equilibrium players' strategies will
be self-enforcing, beliefs may turn out to be anything making the calculation of
payos a little trickier.
Payos Since strategies are also dependent on the belief, the outcome of the
game can only be determined together with the belief . Kreps and Wilson
(1982) have used expectations to aggregate results from dierent beliefs, here
we use the conservativism of the players: They focus on the worst outcomes,
essentially trying to minimise loss.
Before we further discuss the implications of beliefs we need to deal with a
much more fundamental issue. Not all players will necessarily leave the game.
Let h1 denote the last history, where a coalition left the game. Then the
coalition structure that forms is simply
P(;) = K(h1) (2.3)
This set isomorphic with N[fag, where a is a non-strategic player who never
leaves the game, so those in one coalition with a remain in the game. In case
all players in N leave the game a remains a singleton.
Since, in general, not the entire partition is specied, the payo of the coali-
tions is not well-dened. Here and throughout the paper we assume that players
are careful, conservative and thus always look out for the worst case. With a






minPP(;) V (S;P) S 2 P(;)
0 otherwise.
(2.4)
In addition to the coalitional payos, the strategies also determine the in-
dividual ones. Let xi(;) denote the payo of player i in case the strategy
prole  is played and  is the belief function. Formally
xi(;) = wi(;)V (P(;;i);P(;)); or (2.5)
xi() = min
02Bh wi(;0)V (P(;0;i);P(;0)); (2.6)
as it is perhaps more appropriate to specify payos as functions of strategies
only.
Contrary to our setup Bloch (1996) considers a discrete partition function
with optimistic players, so that vi(P()) = maxPK vi(P) for i 2 P().3 The
implications of this dierence will be clear later, but let us provide a motivation
for this change in terms of deviations, a concept we formalise later. A devia-
tion is protable if it is weakly protable to all players. Suppose this deviation
creates a subgame where the sequential coalition formation game continues in-
denitely. In the absence of a stable partition, any of the partitions might form.
Optimistic players expect the best: a partition benecial to the deviation will
form. Bloch's players' optimism goes further: they individually hope the best.
Then a deviation may appear protable even if for every single possible reaction
someone is worse o. Pessimism is consistent in this sense: A player will not
deviate if any of the possible partitions will create a loss to him, in other words
a deviation K is protable for K if and only if it is protable for each player in
K and for each possible partition.
Before we proceed to study equilibria we introduce some additional notation.





minh2Bh wi(h)V (K(h;i);K(h) [ P(h;h)) if i 2 K(h)
minh2Bh wi(h;h)V (P(h;h;i);K(h) [ P(h;h)) otherwise
(2.7)
Now suppose that at history h there is a proposal p = (D;w). For a player
3Recollections do not play a role in Bloch's model, hence the simplied notation.
12i 2 D, should the proposal be accepted the payo becomes
xi(;D;w;h) = min
h2Bh wiV (D(i);K(h) [ D [ P(facceptg [ h
 i;h)) (2.8)
Observe that we can express all elements of the history after the departure of
D using h. The obvious exception is , but since we have to look at the worst
case anyway we might just assume that h was already the worst case for the
post-exit scenario, too.
Before looking at the equilibria of the game, we introduce the following
notation. Suppose x() and y() are payo vectors that are dependent on the
beliefs, but possibly on other things as well. Just like with vectors we say that
x is larger than y for all  2 B and write x(B) > y(B) if x()  y() for all
 2 B and there exists  2 B such that x() > y().
Equilibria Now that we have specied the available strategies (actions), the
resulting payos (incentives) we can focus on the outcomes of the coalition
formation game. We hope to answer two questions simultaneously: (i) which
coalitions will form (ii) what is the distribution of the coalitional payos. In
particular, we look for strategies that do not need revisions, but are nal already
as the game starts and for strategies that are stationary, that is, do not depend
on time, but only on the current state of the game. In nonstationary strategies
the set of equilibria may be too inclusive; for a discussion of folk-theorem-like re-
sults see Muthoo (1990, 1995); Perry and Reny (1994); Osborne and Rubinstein
(1990).
Denition 4. A strategy is stationary if it does not depend on history. For-
mally  is stationary if for all i and for all histories h;h0 2 H such that
K(h) = K(h0) and p(h) = p(h0) we have i(h) = i(h0).
Stationary strategies only depend on the current state s = (K;p), a pair consist-
ing of the partition K of players who have already left and the ongoing proposal
p 2 Pi(h).
When recollections are taken into account we must recall that players are
conservative and only go for certain prots. Even the possibility of a loss deters
the deviators. If the dierent recollections lead to dierent subsequent actions
13from the other players, the deviation may or may not be protable under all
such scenarios.
Denition 5. The strategy prole  is a subgame-perfect equilibrium (with






Denition 6. A stationary perfect equilibrium  is a strategy prole that is
both subgame-perfect and stationary.
The set of stationary perfect equilibrium partitions coincide with the re-
cursive core (K oczy, 2009) (for games with nonempty residual cores). This
equivalence result predicts that games with empty residual cores do not have
stationary perfect equilibria.
Bloch (1996) presents a 3-player example, where player 1 would like to form a
coalition with 2, 2 with 3, 3 with 1. This game does not have stationary-perfect
equilibria. Since residual games are also partition function form games, the
smallest residual game for which the corresponding subgame of the sequential
game has no stationary strategies has an empty core. By a suciently large
payo for the grand coalition the core of the original game is nevertheless empty.
Yet, perfectness only holds globally, that is, if the tiniest subgame fails to have
stationary perfect equilibria this imperfection spreads to the entire game. On
the other hand, just as the recursive core may be non-empty even if the game
has empty residual cores, with a weaker concept of perfection we may retain
some quasi subgame perfect behaviour in the corresponding sequential coalition
formation games, too.
We must therefore look for a weaker concept. Time-consistency (Kydland
and Prescott, 1977) merely requires that the equilibrium strategy does not need
revision along the way and thus will naturally be unaected by empty cores in
subgames outside the equilibrium. This is in contrast with perfectness, where
the property is required in every subgame. Clearly, in most games there are
subgames that are never reached so it is superuous to insist on this property
everywhere, on the other hand time-consistency does not check deviations care-
fully enough: some neighbourhood of the equilibrium should be controlled. We
14then introduce an intermediate concept and study subgame-consistent strate-
gies where the perfectness/consistency criterion is not checked per se for every
subgame, but is only required in relevant subgames.
Denition 7. For a strategy prole  and belief  a subgame at history h is
relevant if
 h is the original game (K(h) = p(h) = ?), or
 there exists a modication 0 and a belief h such that
{  and 0 dier in a single action in history h, resulting in the set D
forming partition D = K(h) n P(;) leaving the game,
{ K(h)  P(0;h), and
{ xD(0;h) > xD(;h), or
 it is a relevant subgame of a relevant subgame.
In the following we explain why subgames covered by each of the cases must
not be overlooked.
The rst case is trivial.
In the second case we look at an elementary deviation that, on the other
hand changes the resulting partition. Since 0 is accepted by D, they benet
from this deviation and hence we have a right to expect that the subgame will be
reached if  is played. Conversely, if the deviation is not protable, the subgame
is never reached, subsequent strategies, actions, deviations are irrelevant. In the
last condition we use the conservatism of the players: if there is a belief that
makes the remaining players act in a way that is harmful to (some) in D, the
deviation 0 does not take place.
Finally we deal with subgames of subgames that are results of secondary,
tertiary, etc. deviations. If the primary subgame is irrelevant, there is no need
to look further (this is the point of (ir)relevance). If it is relevant, we use the
similarity to the \original" game: take this (relevant) game as the game on its
own and study its subgames. Its relevant subgames are relevant also in the
original game.
15Denition 8. The strategy prole  is a subgame-consistent equilibrium4 if






 restrictions to subgames relevant for  are also subgame-consistent.
Denition 9. A stationary consistent equilibrium  is a strategy prole that
is both subgame-consistent and stationary.
We denote the set of stationary consistent equilibria by SCE(N;V ) and
outcomes resulting from playing such equilibrium strategies by 
(N;V ).
3 Results
Theorem 1. Let (N;V ) be a partition function form game. Then its recur-
sive core C(N;V ) coincides with the set 
(N;V ) of outcomes supported by
stationary consistent equilibrium strategy proles.
The rest of this section is devoted to the inductive proof of this theorem. As
the proof is long, we break it into a number of propositions and nally present
a summary of these results.
The following proposition requires no proof:
Proposition 2. Let (f1g;V ) be a trivial, single-player partition function form
game. Then C(f1g;V ) = 
(f1g;V ).
Now assume that Theorem 1 holds for all games with less than k players. In
the following we extend it to games with k players. In order to show 
(N;V ) =
C(N;V ), rst we show 
(N;V )  C(N;V ) then 
(N;V )  C(N;V ).
Lemma 3. If Theorem 1 holds for all games with up to k 1 players, 
(N;V ) 
C(N;V ) for all k-player games.
4In this equilibrium concept perfectness is not required in every state of the game except
in the neighbourhood of the equilibrium strategies and so perhaps the name quasi-perfect
equilibrium would be more appropriate. Unfortunately that term is already taken by van
Damme (1984). His quasi-perfect equilibrium is, however not related to our concept, in fact
even its relation to subgame perfect equilibria is not well dened, while our concept is a
weakening of subgame-perfectness.
16Proof. If 
(N;V ) = ? the result is trivial, so in the following we assume that
there exists a SCE  that results in an outcome !(;) = (x(;);P(;)) 2

(N;V ) for some belief-function . In particular, we assume that !(;) 62
C(N;V ) and prove contradiction.
Our assumption is, by denition, equivalent to the existence of a protable
deviation D by some set D of players. The resulting subgame has fewer players
so our inductive assumption is applicable. In the sequential game the deviation
at h is expressed by the strategy prole 0 against the original strategy prole
, where 0(h0) = (h0) for all h0  h. We discuss three cases.
Case 1. The resulting subgame with K(h) = D, p(h) = ? is irrelevant.
Then for all  i(h) there exists i 2 D and  such that xi(0;) < xi(;) {
clearly the deviation in the partition function form game cannot be protable;
contradiction.
Case 2. The resulting subgame is relevant, the core of the corresponding
residual subgame is empty. Then V (D;D [ PNnD) >
P
i2S xi(;) for all
PNnD. Since V (D;D [ PNnD) = minh2Bh
P
i2S xi(0;) a player in D should
immediately propose D. By subgame consistency all in D will accept. There-
fore  is not a stationary consistent equilibrium, moreover the outcome !(;)
cannot be supported by other equilibria either. Contradiction.
Case 3. The resulting subgame is relevant and the core of the corresponding
residual subgame is not empty. By the assumption that  is a stationary con-
sistent equilibrium, its restriction h to this relevant subgame (where K(h)  D
and p(h) = ?) is a stationary consistent equilibrium, too. Moreover the devia-
tion from  to form D is not protable, therefore
xD(h;Bh) > xD(0h;Bh) (3.1)
On the other hand, by the inductive assumption,
!(h;h) 2 C(L(h);V D) 8(h): (3.2)
This, however implies that in the partition function form game the deviation D
is not protable. Contradiction.
We have discussed all cases, and found the assumptions contradicting. There-
fore !(;) 2 C(N;V ).
17Lemma 4. If Theorem 1 holds for all games with less than k players, then

(N;V )  C(N;V ) for all k-player games (N;V ).
Proof. The proof is inspired by that of Bloch (1996, Proposition 3.2) in part,
and is by construction. We show that if (~ x; ~ P) 2 C(N;V ) there exists a station-
ary consistent strategy prole ~  such that for all  we have P(~ ;) = ~ P and
x(~ ;) = ~ x. Let ~ w = ~ xi P
j2 ~ P(i) ~ xj.
Harsh response First we will dene a harsh response: an eort to stop a
deviating coalition. It is important to note here that this eort is never against
the interest of the players involved, it is one of the preferred behaviours.
Before we provide the formulae we explain or at least indicate the use of this
harsh response, which will also justify the way we formulate it. In the recursive
core a deviation is only protable if it represents an improvement in the payos
for all residual assumptions. In case we are studying the core of the residual
game, the argument works in a similar fashion. When we move to the sequential
game, however, primary deviations can be retaliated, but due to stationarity, as
soon as multiple coalitions have left the game the players do not know which of
these should they punish.
Let us illustrate the problem with an informal example. Under the equilib-
rium strategy players obtain a payo x. Suppose coalitions A and B have left
the game and they do not form a subset of the equilibrium partition (for sim-
plicity: none of them do), therefore someone has deviated. If A deviated rst
N n A (including B) should stop this deviation. This \stopping" implies some
alternative action that results in some payo yA such that yA
A < xA. When
B deviates, too, the remaining N n A n B should also choose an action to get
a payo zB such that zB
B < yA
B. Consequently B does not deviate, yA forms
which is bad for A, hence A does not deviate and the equilibrium is preserved.
What if, however N n A n B are misinformed and think B deviated rst,
calling for response yB, which A did not comply with thus A must be punished
by zA? (Here we assume yB
B < xB and zA
A < yB




A > xA and therefore the response does not work.
Since beliefs are not stationary, now and then N n A n B gets the order
right and nd the right response to the last deviation knowing which coalitions
18have already left. In the following we specify the harsh response to a deviation
knowing that some other coalitions left, too.
We assume therefore, that K has already left the game, but D was (or at
least we think it was) the last to exit.
Consider a proposition p = (D;w). In the partition function form game
(N n K [ D;V KnD) the partition D, as a deviation, denes a residual game
(N n K;V K). We discuss two cases based on the emptiness of the core of this
residual game.
If the residual core is not empty a \harsh response" to D is (~ xDjK; ~ PD) 2
C(N n K;V K) ensuring that the deviation D is not protable. That is, ~ PDjK
satises5
9S 2 D : V (S;K [ ~ PDjK) <
X
i2S
~ xi; or (3.3)














If the residual core is empty we observe that in order for a deviation to
be protable it must be protable for all residual partitions. Since (~ x; ~ P) 2
C(N;V ), in the partition function form game the deviation is not protable
guaranteeing the existence of a residual partition ~ PDjK 2 NnD satisfying





In the following we dene the stationary strategy ~ i for player i. Due to sta-
tionarity it is sucient to specify the strategy for each triple (K;p;B) consisting
of the partition of players who have already quit, the current proposal and the
current belief (thus B  K).
5Observe that from the point of view of externalities only the residual partitions matter,
and therefore we ignore payos.
19~ i(K;T ;w;B) =
8
> > > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > > :
( ~ w; ~ P) if K = T = ?
( ~ wBjK; ~ PBjK) if T = ?, but K 6= ?
accept if xi(~ ;T ;w;(K;B)) > xi(~ ;(K;B))
wait otherwise.
(3.5)
In equilibrium P(~ ) = ~ P and the strategy is stationary by construction so
we only need to verify subgame-consistency. We show this by induction. As
subgame-consistency holds for a trivial game we may assume that it holds for
all games of size less than jNj.
Now consider game (N;V ) and observe the following. If a set of players K
have left the game to form K the subgame is simply a coalition formation game
with less players. We discuss two cases based on the emptiness of the residual
core.
1. If the residual core is not empty, the proposed strategy exhibits the same
similarity property: in equilibrium the core partition is proposed and accepted,
while residual cores form o-equilibrium.
The original assumption about smaller games then ensures that the o-
equilibrium path is subgame-consistent so we only need to check whether a
deviation T is ever accepted. This deviation corresponds to a deviation in
the partition function game. Since (~ x; ~ P) 2 C(N;V ), by the construction of
( ~ wBjK; ~ PBjK) we know that for some B there exists a player in T for whom
the deviation T is not protable. Given the pessimism of the players, this is
sucient to deter this player from accepting the proposal to deviate.
2. If the residual core is empty, the deviation is not protable irrespective
of the residual partition that forms, the subgame is not relevant, and therefore
the second condition for subgame-consistency is satised.
The emptiness of the residual core, by our assumption, also implies that
there are no stationary consistent equilibrium strategy proles. In the absence
of such strategy proles the players in T cannot predict the partition of PNnK
{ in this case, by Expression 2.4, they individually expect the worst. As T only
forms if it is protable, it will, only, if it is protable for all xi(~ ;T ;w;(K;B))
20for all B. Since (~ x; ~ P) 2 C(N;V ) this is not the case. This, on the other
hand implies that the formation of ~ P is unaected by possible deviations in this
subgame, meeting the rst condition of subgame-consistency.
Proof of Theorem 1. The proof is by induction. The result holds for trivial,
single-player games. Assuming that the result holds for all k   1 player games,
the result for k-player games is a corollary of Lemmata 3 & 4.
4 Conclusion
Theorem 1 holds for arbitrary games in discrete partition function form, but
of course it is most interesting for games where some of the residual cores are
empty. When a proposal is made in a game without externalities the invited
players do not even (need to) consider the residual game and therefore the
emptiness of a residual core is not addressed. Huang and Sj ostr om (2006) and
K oczy (2009) simply restrict their attention to games where the residual cores
are non-empty, in fact the r-core (Huang and Sj ostr om, 2003) is not even dened
for games with empty residual cores. As already pointed out by K oczy (2007)
this is not only an enormous limitation given the number of conditions such
games must satisfy (one for each residual game), but the denitions/results do
not apply to some games without externalities and so they are not generali-
sations of the well-known results for TU-games. The present paper heals this
deciency.
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